O Cruzeiro vai precisar ir ao mercado. Logicamente pode esperar, agir conforme as alternativas apareçam, sem pressa, mas com um objetivo: é preciso trazer um atacante. Aliás, uns três.
Com a saída de Edu, tudo indicava que haveria reposição, o que ainda não ocorreu. Nesta quinta-feira (5/1), foi confirmada - o Cruzeiro ainda não anunciou - a saída de Rafa Silva, que recebeu uma oferta milionária da Coreia do Sul e vai ficar lá nas próximas duas temporadas. Há, ainda, a possibilidade de uma terceira, dependendo do desempenho. Assim, o clube perdeu seus dois atacantes de área, com poder de finalização.
Atualmente, o Cruzeiro tem apenas Wesley, Bilu, Bruno Rodrigues, Stênio e Juan Cristian como opções. Desses, Juan ainda está sendo observado e terá oportunidades no Mineiro; Stênio é convocado sucessivamente para a Seleção Brasileira de base e Bilu não veio para ser titular absoluto. O trio ofensivo, em tese, seria Wesley, um centroavante e Bruno Rodrigues. Contudo, até mesmo Bruno pode não ficar, pois recebeu uma oferta do mercado russo.
Ou seja, o setor ofensivo do Cruzeiro pode ser totalmente diferente do de 2022. E há a necessidade de mudar de patamar. Wesley já é uma mostra disso, mas é necessário, também, ter banco. Ou seja, um titular precisa chegar e outro, imediato, também. Além disso, um atleta que joga pelos lados também precisa chegar, sendo outra opção para Pezzolano. O desempenho de alguns atletas na Copa São Paulo também podem qualificar, um ou outro, para o grupo principal. Não seria estranho ver alguns na disputa do Mineiro, para ganharem experiência.
Contudo, para cumprir as expectativas de 2023, é preciso por a mão no bolso e ter coerência. Como em 2022 vimos isso acontecer de forma assertiva, 2023 tende a se repetir a fórmula. E com um detalhe: quem têm chegado, raramente vem por empréstimo, o que aumenta os ativos do clube em futuras negociações.
JOÃO VITOR VIANA
VEJA + Cruzeiro acerta venda de Rafael Santos para clube dos EUA
VEJA + Conheça Bruno Valdez, zagueiro que o Cruzeiro pretende contratar
11 comentários:
SOLUÇÃO DEFINITIVA PARA O MAIOR PROBLEMA DE TODAS AS CIÊNCIAS!!!
Parece que o velho filósofo Sócrates estava certo o tempo inteiro e nós, o povo, ("we, The people" só para sacanear os americanos. Kkk) não conseguimos ver o ÓBVIO há 2500 anos e brigamos, brigamos e brigamos por uma coisa que Platão absorveu de Sócrates e colocou em Diálogos como Teeteto (sobre o conhecimento), Parmênides (sobre o ser) e Sofista (sobre o ser e o não-ser e sobre a dialética ou "diálogo onde são postas duas posições contrárias e não contraditórias").
Uma pergunta é feita pelos filósofos há 2500 anos: quem está certo: Heráclito que disse que "tudo flui" (panta rei) e tudo muda e nada permanece, ou, Parmênides para quem tudo se mantém, tudo é imóvel, tudo mantém o Princípio de Identidade (A=A)?
Repare que não é uma questão boba: pergunte para um FÍSICO, um QUÍMICO, um ASTRÔNOMO, um BIÓLOGO, um PSICÓLOGO, um ECONOMISTA, ou MÉDICO: as Leis da Natureza são sempre as mesmas?
O físico, o astrônomo e o químico vão dizem "são sempre as mesmas!"
Os psicólogos e economistas vão dizer "as Leis da Natureza podem até ser, mas as leis do comportamento humano são diferentes para cada indivíduo".
Os biólogos e médicos, por sua vez, retrucarão dizendo "pelo que estudamos, há uma regularidade nos corpos biológicos mas o medicamento que cura o câncer do indivíduo X não vai fazer efeito nenhum no indivíduo Y".
Temos partidários de Parmênides (A=A) "toda estrela é igual a outra estrela, todo próton é idêntico a outro próton". E temos partidários de Heráclito "cada coisa é diferente de outra coisa, o Rio Amazonas hoje é diferente do Rio Amazonas amanhã, o que funciona pra mim não funciona para o meu irmão gêmeo".
Então, quem está certo? Heráclito ou Parmênides?
"OS DOIS ESTÃO CERTOS!"
Grita Platão, lembrando seu mestre Sócrates.
Senão vejamos: o que os físicos têm de fato? Leis da Natureza que não mudam nunca? De jeito nenhum! Os físicos têm apenas "REGULARIDADES" da natureza! Acha que existe uma Lei de Hubble? Quanto mais distante está um objeto cósmico da Terra maior é a velocidade com que ele se afasta de nós. Acha que existe uma Segunda Lei da Termodinâmica? É apenas uma regularidade que sistemas fechados aumentem seu grau de desordem! Existem sistemas que vão da desordem para a ordem (seres vivos, põe exemplo). Acha que existe uma Lei da Gravitação Universal? Acha que toda a "matéria atrai matéria conforme o produto das massas e inversamente ao quadrado das distâncias"? E a Matéria Escura? Ela parece ter comportamento diferente da matéria ordinária.
Ao mesmo tempo, é possível existir QUALQUER CIÊNCIA sem que exista uma REGULARIDADE no comportamento dos fenômenos? Não, não é possível! Para existir uma ciência é preciso que de algum modo A=A. É preciso imaginar, ou ter uma certeza prática, de que o Rio Amazonas de ontem é o mesmo de hoje e será o mesmo de amanhã. Mas, o Rio Amazonas será o mesmo daqui a 100 milhões de anos? É claro que não! Provavelmente o Rio Amazonas deixará de existir em 100 milhões de anos!
Regularidades! Apenas regularidades, não existem LEIS IMUTÁVEIS!
Viva Platão e Sócrates!
Uma vaia para os teimosos de cabeça-dura!
"Explode!
Explode, Brasilzão, na maior felicidade!
É lindo copiar a Rússia,
Destruindo e enforcando a bandidagem!
Explode! Kkkkk"
Science and Pseudo-Science
First published Wed Sep 3, 2008
The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is part of the larger task to determine which beliefs are epistemically warranted. The entry clarifies the specific nature of pseudoscience in relation to other forms of non-scientific doctrines and practices. The major proposed demarcation criteria are discussed and some of their weaknesses are pointed out. In conclusion, it is emphasized that there is much more agreement in particular issues of demarcation than on the general criteria that such judgments should be based upon. This is an indication that there is still much important philosophical work to be done on the demarcation between science and pseudoscience.
1. The purpose of demarcations
Demarcations of science from pseudoscience can be made for both theoretical and practical reasons (Mahner 2007, 516). From a theoretical point of view, the demarcation issue is an illuminating perspective that contributes to the philosophy of science in the same way that the study of fallacies contributes to the study of informal logic and rational argumentation. From a practical point of view, the distinction is important for decision guidance in both private and public life. Since science is our most reliable source of knowledge in a wide variety of areas, we need to distinguish scientific knowledge from its look-alikes. Due to the high status of science in present-day society, attempts to exaggerate the scientific status of various claims, teachings, and products are common enough to make the demarcation issue pressing in many areas. The demarcation issue is therefore important in many practical applications such as the following:
Healthcare: Medical science develops and evaluates treatments according to evidence of their efficiency. Pseudoscientific activities in this area give rise to inefficient and sometimes dangerous interventions. Healthcare providers, insurers, government authorities and – most importantly – patients need guidance on how to distinguish between medical science and medical pseudoscience.
Expert testimony: It is essential for the rule of law that courts get the facts right. The reliability of different types of evidence must be correctly determined, and expert testimony must be based on the best available knowledge. Sometimes it is in the interest of litigants to present non-scientific claims as solid science. Therefore courts must be able to distinguish between science and pseudoscience.
Environmental policies: In order to be on the safe side against potential disasters it may be legitimate to take preventive measures when there is valid but yet insufficient evidence of an environmental hazard. This must be distinguished from taking measures against an alleged hazard for which there is no valid evidence at all. Therefore, decision-makers in environmental policy must be able to distinguish between scientific and pseudoscientific claims.
Science education: The promoters of some pseudosciences (notably creationism) try to introduce their teachings on school curricula. Teachers and school authorities need to have clear criteria of inclusion that protect students against unreliable and disproved teachings.
2. The “science” of pseudoscience
“Pseudoscience” and “pseudoscientific” are unavoidably defamatory words (Laudan 1983, 118; Dolby 1987, 204). It would be as strange for someone to proudly describe her own activities as pseudoscience as to boast that they are bad science. Since the derogatory connotation is an essential characteristic of the word “pseudoscience”, an attempt to extricate a value-free definition of the term would not be meaningful. An essentially value-laden term has to be defined in value-laden terms. This is often difficult since the specification of the value component tends to be controversial.
This problem is not specific to pseudoscience but follows directly from a parallel but somewhat less conspicuous problem with the concept of science. The common usage of the term “science” can be described as partly descriptive, partly normative. When an activity is recognized as science this usually involves an acknowledgement that it has a positive role in our strivings for knowledge. On the other hand the concept of science has been formed through a historical process, and many contingencies influence what we call and do not call science.
Against this background, in order not to be unduly complex a definition of science has to go in either of two ways. It can focus on the descriptive contents, and specify how the term is actually used. Alternatively, it can focus on the normative element, and clarify the more fundamental meaning of the term. The latter approach has been the choice of most philosophers writing on the subject, and will be at focus here. It involves, of necessity, some degree of idealization in relation to common usage of the term “science”.
The English word “science” is primarily used about the natural sciences and other fields of research that are considered to be similar to them. Hence, political economy and sociology are counted as sciences, whereas studies of literature and history are usually not. The corresponding German word, “Wissenschaft”, has a much broader meaning and includes all the academic specialties, including the humanities. The German term has the advantage of more adequately delimiting of the type of systematic knowledge that is at stake in the conflict between science and pseudoscience. The misrepresentations of history presented by Holocaust deniers and other pseudo-historians are very similar in nature to the misrepresentations of natural science promoted by creationists and homeopaths.
More importantly, the natural and social sciences and the humanities are all part of the same human endeavour, namely systematic and critical investigations aimed at acquiring the best possible understanding of the workings of nature, man, and human society. The disciplines that form this community of knowledge disciplines are increasingly interdependent (Hansson 2007). Since the second half of the 20th century, integrative disciplines such as astrophysics, evolutionary biology, biochemistry, ecology, quantum chemistry, the neurosciences, and game theory have developed at dramatic speed and contributed to tying together previously unconnected disciplines. These increased interconnections have also linked the sciences and the humanities closer to each other, as can be seen for instance from how historical knowledge relies increasingly on advanced scientific analysis of archaeological findings.
The conflict between science and pseudoscience is best understood with this extended sense of science. On one side of the conflict we find the community of knowledge disciplines that includes the natural and social sciences and the humanities. On the other side we find a wide variety of movements and doctrines, such as creationism, astrology, homeopathy, and Holocaust denialism that are in conflict with results and methods that are generally accepted in the community of knowledge disciplines.
3. The “pseudo” of pseudoscience
3.1 Non-, un-, and pseudoscience
The phrases “demarcation of science” and “demarcation of science from pseudoscience” are often used interchangeably, and many authors seem to have regarded them as equal in meaning. In their view the task of drawing the outer boundaries of science is essentially the same as that of drawing the boundary between science and pseudoscience.
This picture is oversimplified. All non-science is not pseudoscience, and science has non-trivial borders to other non-scientific phenomena, such as metaphysics, religion, and various types of non-scientific systematized knowledge. Mahner (2007, 548) proposed the term “parascience” to cover non-scientific practices that are not pseudoscientific.) Science also has the internal demarcation problem of distinguishing between good and bad science.
A comparison of the negated terms related to science can contribute to clarify the conceptual distinctions. “Unscientific” is a narrower concept than “non-scientific” (not scientific), since the former but not the latter term implies some form of contradiction or conflict with science. “Pseudoscientific” is in its turn a narrower concept than “unscientific”. The latter term differs from the former in covering inadvertent mismeasurements and miscalculations and other forms of bad science performed by scientists who are recognized as trying but failing to produce good science.
Etymology provides us with an obvious starting-point for clarifying what characteristics pseudoscience has in addition to being merely non- or un-scientific. “Pseudo-” (ψευδο-) means false. In accordance with this, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines pseudoscience as follows:
“A pretended or spurious science; a collection of related beliefs about the world mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method or as having the status that scientific truths now have.”
3.2 Non-science posing as science
Many writers on pseudoscience have emphasized that pseudoscience is non-science posing as science. The foremost modern classic on the subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science. According to Brian Baigrie (1988, 438), “[w]hat is objectionable about these beliefs is that they masquerade as genuinely scientific ones.” These and many other authors assume that to be pseudoscientific, an activity or a teaching has to satisfy the following two criteria (Hansson 1996):
(1) it is not scientific, and
(2) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific.
The former of these two criteria is central to the concerns of the philosophy of science. It has been the subject of important controversies among philosophers, to be discussed below in Section 4. The second criterion is philosophically less important, but it needs careful treatment not least since many discussions of pseudoscience (in and out of philosophy) have been confused due to insufficient attention to it.
3.3 The doctrinal component
An immediate problem with the definition based on (1) and (2) is that it is too wide. There are phenomena that satisfy both criteria but are yet not commonly called pseudoscientific. One of the clearest examples of this is fraud in science. This is a practice that has a high degree of scientific pretence and yet does not comply with science, thus satisfying both criteria. Nevertheless, fraud in otherwise legitimate branches of science is seldom if ever called “pseudoscience”. The reason for this can be clarified with the following hypothetical examples (Hansson 1996).
Case 1: A biochemist performs an experiment that she interprets as showing that a particular protein has an essential rôle in muscle contraction. There is a consensus among her colleagues that the result is a mere artefact, due to experimental error.
Case 2: A biochemist goes on performing one sloppy experiment after the other. She consistently interprets them as showing that a particular protein has a rôle in muscle contraction not accepted by other scientists.
Case 3: A biochemist performs various sloppy experiments in different areas. One is the experiment referred to in case 1. Much of her work is of the same quality. She does not propagate any particular unorthodox theory.
According to common usage, 1 and 3 are regarded as cases of bad science, and only 2 as a case of pseudoscience. What is present in case 2, but absent in the other two, is a deviant doctrine. Isolated breaches of the requirements of science are not commonly regarded as pseudoscientific. Pseudoscience, at it is commonly conceived, involves a sustained effort to promote teachings different from those that have scientific legitimacy at the time.
This explains why fraud in science is not usually regarded as pseudoscientific. Such practices are not in general associated with a deviant or unorthodox doctrine. To the contrary, the fraudulent scientist is anxious that her results be in conformity with the predictions of established scientific theories. Deviations from these would lead to a much higher risk of disclosure.
The term “science” has both an individuated and an unindividuated sense. In the individuated sense, biochemistry and astronomy are different sciences, one of which includes studies of muscle contraction and the other studies of supernovae. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines this sense of science as “a particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of learning”. In the unindividuated sense, the study of muscle proteins and that of supernovae are parts of “one and the same” science. In the words of the OED, unindividuated science is “the kind of knowledge or intellectual activity of which the various ‘sciences‘ are examples”.
Pseudoscience is an antithesis of science in the individuated rather than the unindividuated sense. There is no unified corpus of pseudoscience corresponding to the corpus of science. For a phenomenon to be pseudoscientific, it must belong to one or the other of the particular pseudosciences. In order to accommodate this feature, the above definition can be modified by replacing (2) by the following (Hansson 1996):
(2′) it is part of a non-scientific doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific.
Most philosophers of science, and most scientists, prefer to regard science as constituted by methods of inquiry rather than by particular doctrines. There is an obvious tension between (2′) and this conventional view of science. This, however, may be as it should since pseudoscience often involves a representation of science as a closed and finished doctrine rather than as a methodology for open-ended inquiry.
4. Alternative demarcation criteria
Attempts to define what we today call science have a long history, and the roots of the demarcation problem have sometimes been traced back to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (Laudan 1983). However it was not until the 20th century that influential definitions of science have contrasted it against pseudoscience.
4.1 The logical positivists
Around 1930, the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle developed various verificationist approaches to science. The basic idea was that a scientific statement could be distinguished from a metaphysical statement by being at least in principle possible to verify. This standpoint was associated with the view that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification (see the section on Verificationism in the entry on the Vienna Circle). This proposal has often been included in accounts of the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. However, this is not historically quite accurate since the verificationist proposals had the aim of solving a distinctly different demarcation problem, namely that between science and metaphysics.
4.2 Falsificationism
Popper described the demarcation problem as the “key to most of the fundamental problems in the philosophy of science” (Popper 1962, 42). He refuted verifiability as a criterion for a scientific theory or hypothesis to be scientific, rather than pseudoscientific or metaphysical. Instead he proposed as a criterion that the theory be falsifiable, or more precisely that “statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations” (Popper 1962, 39).
Popper presented this proposal as a way to draw the line between statements belonging to the empirical sciences and “all other statements – whether they are of a religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudoscientific” (Popper 1962, 39; cf. Popper 1974, 981). It was both an alternative to the logical positivists’ verification criteria and a criterion for distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. Although Popper did not emphasize the distinction, these are of course two different issues (Bartley 1968). Popper maintained that metaphysical statements may be “far from meaningless” (1974, 978–979) but showed no such appreciation of pseudoscientific statements.
Popper's demarcation criterion has been criticized both for excluding legitimate science (Hansson 2006) and for giving some pseudosciences the status of being scientific (Agassi 1991; Mahner 2007, 518–519). Strictly speaking, his criterion excludes the possibility that there can be a pseudoscientific claim that is refutable. According to Larry Laudan (1983, 121), it “has the untoward consequence of countenancing as ‘scientific’ every crank claim which makes ascertainably false assertions”. Astrology, rightly taken by Popper as an unusually clear example of a pseudoscience, has in fact been tested and thoroughly refuted (Culver and Ianna 1988; Carlson 1985). Similarly, the major threats to the scientific status of psychoanalysis, another of his major targets, do not come from claims that it is untestable but from claims that it has been tested and failed the tests.
Defenders of Popper have claimed that this criticism relies on an uncharitable interpretation of his ideas. They claim that he should not be interpreted as meaning that falsifiability is a sufficient condition for demarcating science. Some passages seem to suggest that he takes it as only a necessary condition (Feleppa 1990, 142). Other passages suggest that for a theory to be scientific, Popper requires (in addition to falsifiability) that energetic attempts are made to put the theory to test and that negative outcomes of the tests are accepted (Cioffi 1985, 14–16). A falsification-based demarcation criterion that includes these elements will avoid the most obvious counter-arguments to a criterion based on falsifiability alone.
However, in what seems to be his last statement of his position, Popper declared that falsifiability is both a necessary and a sufficient criterion. “A sentence (or a theory) is empirical-scientific if and only if it is falsifiable”. Furthermore, he emphasized that the falsifiability referred to here “only has to do with the logical structure of sentences and classes of sentences” (Popper [1989] 1994, 82). A (theoretical) sentence, he says, is falsifiable if and only if it logically contradicts some (empirical) sentence that describes a logically possible event that it would be logically possible to observe (Popper [1989] 1994, 83). A statement can be falsifiable in this sense although it is not in practice possible to falsify it. It would seem to follow from this interpretation that a statement's status as scientific or non-scientific does not shift with time. On previous occasions he seems to have interpreted falsifiability differently, and maintained that “what was a metaphysical idea yesterday can become a testable scientific theory tomorrow; and this happens frequently” (Popper 1974, 981, cf. 984).
Logical falsifiability is a much weaker criterion than practical falsifiability. However, even logical falsifiability can create problems in practical demarcations. Popper once adopted the view that natural selection is not a proper scientific theory since it comes close to only saying that “survivors survive”, which is tautological. “Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program” (Popper 1976, 168). This statement has been criticized by evolutionary scientists who pointed out that it misrepresents evolution. The theory of natural selection has given rise to many predictions that have withstood tests both in field studies and in laboratory settings (Ruse 1977; 2000).
In a lecture in Darwin College in 1977, Popper retracted his previous view that the theory of natural selection is tautological. He now admitted that it is a testable theory although “difficult to test” (Popper 1978, 344). However, in spite of his well-argued recantation his previous standpoint continues to be propagated in defiance of the accumulating evidence from empirical tests of natural selection.
4.3 The criterion of puzzle-solving
Thomas Kuhn is one of many philosophers for whom Popper's view on the demarcation problem was a starting-point for developing their own ideas. Kuhn criticized Popper for characterizing “the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts” (Kuhn 1974, 802). Popper's focus on falsifications of theories led to a concentration on the rather rare instances when a whole theory is at stake. According to Kuhn, the way in which science works on such occasions cannot be used to characterize the entire scientific enterprise. Instead it is in “normal science”, the science that takes place between the unusual moments of scientific revolutions, that we find the characteristics by which science can be distinguished from other enterprises (Kuhn 1974, 801).
4.4 Criteria based on scientific progress
Popper's demarcation criterion concerns the logical structure of theories. Imre Lakatos described this criterion as “a rather stunning one. A theory may be scientific even if there is not a shred of evidence in its favour, and it may be pseudoscientific even if all the available evidence is in its favour. That is, the scientific or non-scientific character of a theory can be determined independently of the facts” (Lakatos 1981, 117).
Instead, Lakatos (1970; 1974a; 1974b; 1981) proposed a modification of Popper's criterion that he called “sophisticated (methodological) falsificationism”. On this view, the demarcation criterion should not be applied to an isolated hypothesis or theory but rather to a whole research program that is characterized by a series of theories successively replacing each other. In his view, a research program is progressive if the new theories make surprising predictions that are confirmed. In contrast, a degenerating research programme is characterized by theories being fabricated only in order to accommodate known facts. Progress in science is only possible if a research program satisfies the minimum requirement that each new theory that is developed in the program has a larger empirical content than its predecessor. If a research program does not satisfy this requirement, then it is pseudoscientific.
According to Paul Thagard, a theory or discipline is pseudoscientific if it satisfies two criteria. One of these is that the theory fails to progress, and the other that “the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations” (Thagard 1978, 228). A major difference between his approach and that of Lakatos is that Lakatos would classify a nonprogressive discipline as pseudoscientific even if its practitioners work hard to improve it and turn it into a progressive discipline.
In a somewhat similar vein, Daniel Rothbart (1990) emphasized the distinction between the standards that should be used when testing a theory and those that should be used when determining whether a theory should at all be tested. The latter, the eligibility criteria, include that the theory should encapsulate the explanatory success of its rival, and that it should yield test implications that are inconsistent with those of the rival. According to Rothbart, a theory is unscientific if it is not testworthy in this sense.
George Reisch proposed that demarcation could be based on the requirement that a scientific discipline be adequately integrated into the other sciences. The various scientific disciplines have strong interconnections that are based on methodology, theory, similarity of models etc. Creationism, for instance, is not scientific because its basic principles and beliefs are incompatible with those that connect and unify the sciences. More generally speaking, says Reisch, an epistemic field is pseudoscientific if it cannot be incorporated into the existing network of established sciences (Reisch 1998; cf. Bunge 1982, 379).
4.5 Epistemic norms
A different approach, namely to base demarcation criteria on the value base of science, was proposed by sociologist Robert K. Merton ([1942] 1973). According to Merton, science is characterized by an “ethos”, i.e. spirit, that can be summarized as four sets of institutional imperatives. The first of these, universalism, asserts that whatever their origins, truth claims should be subjected to preestablished, impersonal criteria. This implies that the acceptance or rejection of claims should not depend on the personal or social qualities of their protagonists.
The second imperative, communism, says that the substantive findings of science are the products of social collaboration and therefore belong to the community, rather than being owned by individuals or groups. This is, as Merton pointed out, incompatible with patents that reserve exclusive rights of use to inventors and discoverers. The term “communism” is somewhat infelicitous; “communality” probably captures better what Merton aimed at.
His third imperative, disinterestedness, imposes a pattern of institutional control that is intended to curb the effects of personal or ideological motives that individual scientists may have. The fourth imperative, organized scepticism, implies that science allows detached scrutiny of beliefs that are dearly held by other institutions. This is what sometimes brings science into conflicts with religions and other ideologies.
Merton described these criteria as belonging to the sociology of science, and thus as empirical statements about norms in actual science rather than normative statements about how science should be conducted (Merton [1942] 1973, 268). His criteria have often been dismissed by sociologists as oversimplified, and they have only had limited influence in philosophical discussions on the demarcation issue (Dolby 1987; Ruse 2000). Their potential in the latter context does not seem to have been sufficiently explored.
4.6 Multi-criterial approaches
Popper's method of demarcation consists essentially of the single criterion of falsifiability (although some authors have wanted to combine it with the additional criteria that tests are actually performed and their outcomes respected, see Section 4.2). Most of the other criteria discussed above are similarly mono-criterial, of course with Merton's proposal as a major exception.
Most authors who have proposed demarcation criteria have instead put forward a list of such criteria. A large number of lists have been published that consist of (usually 5–10) criteria that can be used in combination to identify a pseudoscience or pseudoscientific practice. This includes lists by Langmuir ([1953] 1989), Gruenberger (1964), Dutch (1982), Bunge (1982), Radner and Radner (1982), Kitcher (1982, 30–54), Hansson (1983), Grove (1985), Thagard (1988), Glymour and Stalker (1990), Derkson (1993, 2001), Vollmer (1993), Ruse (1996, 300–306) and Mahner (2007). Many of the criteria that appear on such lists relate closely to criteria discussed above in Sections 4.2 and 4.4. One such list reads as follows:
Belief in authority: It is contended that some person or persons have a special ability to determine what is true or false. Others have to accept their judgments.
Nonrepeatable experiments: Reliance is put on experiments that cannot be repeated by others with the same outcome.
Handpicked examples: Handpicked examples are used although they are not representative of the general category that the investigation refers to.
Unwillingness to test: A theory is not tested although it is possible to test it.
Disregard of refuting information: Observations or experiments that conflict with a theory are neglected.
Built-in subterfuge: The testing of a theory is so arranged that the theory can only be confirmed, never disconfirmed, by the outcome.
Explanations are abandoned without replacement. Tenable explanations are given up without being replaced, so that the new theory leaves much more unexplained than the previous one. (Hansson 1983)
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Lakatos, Imre (1970). “Falsification and the Methodology of Research program, pp 91–197 in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lakatos, Imre (1974a). “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”, pp. 241–273 in P.A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, The Library of Living Philosophers, vol xiv, book i. La Salle: Open Court.
Lakatos, Imre (1974b). “Science and pseudoscience”, Conceptus, 8: 5–9.
Lakatos, Imre (1981). “Science and pseudoscience”, pp. 114–121 in S Brown et al. (eds.) Conceptions of Inquiry: A Reader London: Methuen.
Langmuir, Irving ([1953] 1989). “Pathological Science”, Physics Today, 42/10: 36–48.
Laudan, Larry (1983). “The demise of the demarcation problem”, pp. 111–127 in R.S. Cohan and L. Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Lugg, Andrew (1987). “Bunkum, Flim-Flam and Quackery: Pseudoscience as a Philosophical Problem” Dialectica, 41: 221–230.
Lugg, Andrew (1992). “Pseudoscience as nonsense”, Methodology and Science, 25: 91–101.
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